L’article de Tony Blair m’a tellement insupporté par toute la fausseté
et la petitesse qui en faisaient la forme et le fond qu’il m’a plu de connaître
à la lecture de l’ouvrage précis et fin de Christopher Clark, « Les
somnambules -Eté 1914 : comment l’Europe a marché vers la guerre » (Editions Flammarion, 2013) le
passage sur le discours de Benjamin Disraeli dont le teneur nous rappelle, qu’autrefois,
des hommes politiques savaient ce qu’était de penser, de proposer, de tracer. Ce
discours du 9 février 1871 est à bien des égards remarquable
Dans son propos que vous trouverez ci-dessous ou bien dans le Hansard,
l’ancien futur Premier ministre fait un tableau général de l’état des
relations internationales depuis la
défaite de la France en 1870 qui entraîne, selon lui, la remise en cause du
traité de Paris de 1856 qui mit un terme à la guerre de Crimée et oblige à une
nouvelle diplomatie.
Il s’inquiète de voir la Russie passer d’une politique « légitime »
d’expansion qui la conduit en mer Noire à la conquête ou le contrôle des
Détroits ce qu’il juge « dangereux ». De même pointe-t-il du doigt
les ambitions et les belligérances des Etats-Unis au nom de leur « exception ».
Quant à l’Allemagne de Bismarck il en souligne l’état tout à fait singulier et
ne discerne pas de danger pour le Royaume-Uni : on oublie trop souvent que
le chancelier allemand était de mesure (l’annexion de l’Alsace et de la
Lorraine lui a été plus imposée) et de
prudence (question balkanique), ce n’est qu’après son départ en 1890 que les
relations entre l’Allemagne et l’Angleterre iront en se dégradant, l’hostilité
d’Edouard VII envers Guillaume II était publique.
Sir, it is little more than
six months since Parliament was prorogued, under circumstances of great
anxiety, and we are re-assembled to-day to encounter a state of affairs that
all must admit to be greatly complicated, and which I myself think to be not
devoid of danger. When we returned to our constituencies Europe was on the eve
of a war which, looking to its consequences, may, perhaps, be described as the
most important war of this century. Her Majesty's Government then took the
opportunity of indicating to the House the general policy which they felt it
their duty, under the circumstances, to advise Her Majesty to follow. That
policy was a policy of neutrality, and was a wise and a just policy. I cannot
recall at this moment whether war had been declared at that period; but whether
it had or not, there was a considerable and mysterious pause before the actual
commencement of hostilities which 71 was very
favourable to negotiation; and I then took the liberty of suggesting to the
right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government that the policy of the
Government should not only be a policy of neutrality, but of an armed
neutrality. The right hon. Gentleman then said that a policy of armed
neutrality was a very serious thing. That was why I recommended it. We had to
deal with a very serious state of affairs, and it appeared to me that if we
were to have a chance of coping with them and controlling them we should use an
instrument of equal temper. The operation of an armed neutrality is three-fold.
Its first tendency, of course, is to prevent; its second, to shorten war; and,
in the third place—and not the least important—when pacification is contemplated,
to insure the acceptance of just and temperate terms of peace, so that the
seeds of future disquiet and inevitable struggle should not occur at the very
moment when general tranquillity appears to be about to be accomplished. The
last instance of an armed neutrality was the occupation of the Danubian
Provinces by Austria; and I believe that no one will deny that that act on the
part of Austria tended greatly to shorten the Crimean War. I do not presume for
a moment to speak on this question of high general policy as one more competent
to deliver an opinion upon it than any Gentleman who is sitting in this House;
but hon. Members may, perhaps, recollect that four years ago myself and my then
Colleagues had under responsibility the duty of considering a state of affairs
almost identical with that state of affairs which obtained in the middle of
last July. There was then a war imminent, occasioned by the rivalry between
France and Prussia. Indeed, for 48 hours it appeared inevitable, and yet that
war was prevented—was prevented by that Treaty which guaranteed the neutrality
of Luxemburg, upon which I will not at this moment dwell, though I may have to
advert to it. Now, that was an opportunity, certainly, all will admit, to those
who had then the management of affairs, to form some opinion as to the motives
of the principal actors in those transactions, the influences which regulated
their conduct, and the objects which they contemplated; and we arrived then at
three results for the future regulation of our 72 conduct in
these matters. First of all, which was of course obvious, that the danger to
the peace of Europe was the rivalry between France and Prussia; secondly, that
Prussia would never commence hostilities herself; and thirdly—and that was the
most important and practical point—that it was consequently necessary that the
English Government should concentrate all its resources, all its diplomatic
influence, and exercise its unceasing vigilance at Paris, to prevent the ruler
of France from commencing hostilities, which were so dreaded and deprecated.
Now, it does not appear to me that Her Majesty's Ministers, when these
unfortunate transactions commenced in July, did use that requisite energy, and
were not sufficiently prepared for the circumstances which they had to
encounter. I must remind the House that Her Majesty's Ministers were placed in
a peculiarly favourable opportunity to press their opinions and their policy
upon the Emperor of the French. I give Her Majesty's Government full credit for
the energy and promptitude with which they obtained the withdrawal of the
candidature of the Prussian pretender to the Throne of Spain. But their success
in that proceeding gave them an additional claim and hold upon the French
Government:—because the House will understand that for a mediator to come
forward between two such Powers as France and Prussia, and accomplish so
difficult a task as the withdrawal of the Prussian Prince who was a candidate
for the Spanish throne, required a great exertion and expenditure of influence
on the part of the Crown of this country. Influence, however considerable, is
at the same time a limited quality. It cannot be expended for a certain object,
or in a certain degree, without being diminished for other purposes in an equal
degree. If Her Majesty, for instance, made an appeal to the King of Prussia
that ultimately led to the withdrawal of the pretender to the throne of Spain,
on other occasions and in reference to other matters, no doubt such a course
would give Prussia a moral claim on England. Her Majesty had done the Emperor
of the French a great service: and if at that moment—in July—the business had
stopped as it was, the Emperor of the French would have had a considerable
diplomatic triumph. It would 73 have added
to the credit of his dynasty and position, and would have been owing to the
mediatorial influence of the Crown of England. When the Ambassador of the Queen
therefore went to the Emperor of the French and announced that he had succeeded
in his difficult and important office, and the Emperor—notwithstanding his
appeal to the Queen to use her influence, and notwithstanding that Her Majesty
had used her influence successfully—the Emperor said, "I will,
nevertheless, proceed on my own course," Lord Lyons should have
declared—"This is an outrage to the Crown of England, and I am instructed
to tell you that if you thus discard the result of the Queen's intervention,
and if this is the mode in which you express your gratitude for the successful
exertions of the solicited influence of our Sovereign, you must take the
consequences. I do not say we are going to throw ourselves into the fray, but
the neutrality that we shall observe will be an armed neutrality." If that
had been the case, I do not believe there would have been war.
Sir, there was another ground
on which I apprehend the right hon. Gentleman might have successfully appealed
to the Emperor of the French and prevented the war, and that was — I called it
to the recollection of the House at the end of last Session—that Russia and
Great Britain had guaranteed to Prussia the possession of her Saxon provinces,
and that if Russia and Great Britain had represented to the Emperor of the French—being
neutral Powers, and his allies—that if he persisted in the insane course upon
which he was about to enter, it was more than probable that he would force
Russia and Great Britain to place themselves in a position if not absolutely of
belligerents, yet in a hostile position, that would have influenced a Sovereign
who was hesitating to the very end. You must remember that the Emperor of the
French was for peace in the morning and war in the evening, and if the English
Ambassador had, in the interval, represented a definite policy, such as that
which I have indicated, there is every probability that the Emperor of the
French would never have embarked in this war. Now, what was the answer given to
me by the right hon. Gentleman? The right hon. Gentleman rose and repudiated
the guarantees which had been 74 given by
this country and Russia to Prussia of the possession of her Saxon provinces,
and he gave two reasons for his repudiation. The guarantee was given in 1815
under the Treaty of Vienna, The right hon. Gentleman said, that Prussia had
become much more powerful since the guarantee of the Saxon provinces was given
in 1815, and he said, in the second place, that the Diet of Germany had been
recently abolished. Now, Sir, the first reason of the right hon. Gentleman was
a strange one. If I owed a man £5,000, and he asked me to repay him, he would
be surprised if I said to him—"True, it is, I owe you £5,000; but in the
interval that has elapsed since the loan you have come into the possession of
an estate of £5,000 a year, you are more powerful and richer, and therefore
your claim can no longer be recognized." Then, with regard to the second
reason, the abolition of the German Diet, I answer at once that the guarantee
does not at all refer to the German Diet in any sense whatever, and the only
effect of the existence of the German Diet would be this—that, in all
probability, Prussia would then have a right to appeal to the other Powers of
Germany to assist her if her Saxon provinces had been invaded. The question for
Her Majesty's Government was this—What were the circumstances contemplated when
the guarantee of the Treaty of Vienna was given by the Great Powers? Now, what
were the circumstances? The circumstances were these — The signataries to the
Treaty of Vienna, in the distribution arrangement of territory, were anxious
that States bordering upon France should be strengthened. France was looked
upon as the great disturber. Future aggression was contemplated by France, and
it was therefore thought the best policy to strengthen, as much as possible,
the States contiguous to the French boundary. For that reason the King of
Sardinia received a great accession of territory, and the kingdom of the
Netherlands was created. But the brunt of the struggle was evidently to be
borne by Prussia. Prussia was to take the Rhenish provinces. Prussia required,
and deserved, compensation for her great sacrifices and sufferings; and though
she wished to find that compensation in the North of Germany, she ultimately
accepted the Saxon pro- 75 vinces on
condition that a guarantee should be given by the Great Powers, and especially
by England, that practically, in case there was a war occasioned by the
aggressions of France, and Prussia was attacked in her new territory, she
should be guarded by the guarantee which was given. Now, what were the
circumstances in July last? It is difficult for us to realize what was the
state of affairs in July now that the King of Prussia is sleeping in the bed of
Louis Quatorze at Versailles. But the fact is the King of Prussia was very much
alarmed at the state of affairs; he had been surprised—I mean, of course, in a
military sense—and was not prepared for war. Although, as I have heard, and
have no doubt, the Prussians did not despair of ultimate success in the
struggle, they were, in a military sense, surprised; and Russia, which has
since made so many Field Marshals, was particularly anxious, to support Her Majesty's
Government in maintaining peace last July. There is no country more adverse to
war than Russia, and it is very much to her credit; but, as she generally
attains her objects without war, this is less surprising; but if there be any
kind of war which Russia especially dislikes, it is an European war, and an
European war commenced by France. These were the circumstances we had to deal
with in July last; and I maintain that if proper representations had been made
to the Emperor of the French—if it had been pressed upon him that this country
had entered into solemn engagements guaranteeing the provinces of Saxony to the
King of Prussia—the Emperor of the French would have recoiled from the possible
results of an infringement of the Treaty. Some hon. Gentlemen seem to be
incredulous as to Prussia not being ready for immediate war in July last. I
speak on the very highest authority when I say that Prussia was perfectly
prepared for seeing the Palatinate overrun by the French. As far as the
Palatinate was concerned, the Prussians had no doubt that the French would
entirely and immediately overrun it, although they may have had confidence that
they could prevent their capital being taken. It was under these
circumstances—very different, of course, from those which now prevail—that a
successful appeal, in my opinion, might have been made by our Government, 76 upon this
ground, to the Emperor of the French; and, I think the war might have been
prevented. How was the case met by our Government, and, I am sorry to say, by
more than one hon. Gentleman who spoke on the occasion alluded to? It was met
on the part of the Government by a repudiation of a national engagement, a
treaty of the most solemn and stringent kind. I want to know what hon.
Gentlemen mean by the habit which, I am sorry to say, I have seen of late
growing up in this House, of deriding the character and stipulations of
treaties. What is the alternative if they are not supported, if they are not
upheld by public opinion and by the sentiment of the House of Commons? What
alternative is there? If it be true, as we have heard from a high authority,
that no Power will observe a treaty the moment it has the opportunity of
breaking it, you are really dissolving society into its original elements,
which appear to me to be "blood and iron." It is easy to say that the
Treaty of Vienna has been violated twenty times over, and that it is an
obsolete document; but, in the first place, it has not been violated twenty,
nor ten, nor five times over. No doubt, great changes have been made in the
distribution and arrangement of territory which it sanctioned; but the Great
Powers and statesmen who attended the Congress of Vienna most scrupulously and
cautiously abstained from doing more than sanction an arrangement and
distribution which was the inevitable consequence of a long war; and they never
in any instance bound themselves to maintain the distribution that was then
made, except in the case of the Saxon provinces of Prussia. Even if the Treaty
of Vienna had been in some instances violated—which I dispute, but do not dwell
upon now, because it does not touch the question—that is no reason why other
important stipulations, which have not been violated, should not be maintained.
There are many things of the utmost importance in the Treaty of Vienna besides
the mere arrangement and distribution of territory. That was considered by the
leading statesmen in this manner. They said—"We will not bind ourselves to
any of these arrangements of territory; we contemplate that the time may come
when changes will occur, and when those changes occur we will consider 77 them on
their merits." The withdrawal of the Austrians from Italy is no violation
of the Treaty of Vienna in the circumstances under which it was accomplished;
nor, I believe, in the opinion of higher authorities than myself, are any of
those changes which have occurred violations of the Treaty, though they are
changes of it. But in the Treaty there are things in importance equal to or
greater than that of the distribution of territory. Take, for instance, the
free navigation of rivers; that is one of the most important subjects that can
possibly engage our attention. If, in the conduct of public business, a
question arose as to the navigation of rivers, and I was told that the Treaty
of Vienna was an obsolete document, and that it must not be referred to, I
should be totally at a loss as to where I was to find any foundation for the
doctrine of the free navigation of rivers, which is of the utmost importance to
the welfare of humanity. Judging from what I hear, before a month is over we
may be discussing in this House the free navigation of the Danube. Where would
you be if the Treaty of Vienna, which was the first public document that, by a
series of masterly clauses and provisions, established the free navigation of
rivers—where would you be if the Treaty of Vienna was to be looked upon as a
mere obsolete document? There is another river the free navigation of which,
judging from all we hear, will be under our consideration soon. I mean the St.
Lawrence. If we are not to respect the rights of nations as determined by the
Treaty of Vienna, I do not believe there is any document in existence which
will enable you to treat in a satisfactory manner the question of the
navigation of the St. Lawrence.
In my opinion there was not
sufficient energy exercised on the part of Her Majesty's Government in July
last, at the commencement of these unhappy circumstances, to meet the
conjuncture, and that they were not prepared for an event which, in my opinion,
they ought to have contemplated. The proper policy for England would have been
an armed neutrality; it might have prevented, and it certainly would have
shortened the war; and if it had existed at this moment, I have no doubt it
would have obtained for the discomfited just and temperate terms, and given a
dif- 78 ferent
character to Europe. But I may be told—"An armed neutrality might have
been, under the circumstances, a very sufficient and proper policy; but how
could an armed neutrality be adopted by a country without armaments?" I
admit we should have placed ourselves in a position that might have been
awkward and embarrassing if it could have been shown that this terrible war
between rival races—for it comes to that—has been occasioned by neutrals not
having that command of organized force which becomes great nations. It is
possible that the Ambassador of the Queen, when he went to the Emperor of the
French to make the appeal which I suggest, might have been answered in this
manner—the Emperor of the French, who is extremely well-informed about
everything in England, might have said—"Yes, Sir; I understand the policy
of your Government is an armed neutrality; but an armed neutrality is a very
serious thing for a nation that for a year and a half has been disbanding its
veterans; an armed neutrality is a very serious thing for a nation with
skeleton battalions and attenuated squadrons, and batteries without sufficient
guns, and yet more guns than gunners; an armed neutrality is a very serious
thing for a nation without a military reserve." The Emperor of the French
might have added—"Nevertheless, you are still mistress of the ocean; yet,
as you must have a Channel Meet, and scarcely can do without a Mediterranean
Fleet, I think it would be difficult for you to establish a fleet for the North
Sea, since for a year and a half you have left off shipbuilding—since you have
reduced your famous blue-jackets — since, as I well know, you have not been
furnishing due artillery to your men-of-war, and you can't deny that for a year
and a half you have been living on the stores that were accumulated by
preceding Governments." Sir, I confess that would have been an answer to
my suggestion of armed neutrality which would have been certainly for the moment
somewhat embarrassing. I have no wish on this occasion to make a single
criticism upon the conduct of the two right hon. Gentlemen who preside over the
great Departments of the Army and the Admiralty. They were preferred to those
eminent posts because, as was understood generally in the country, they were 79 deemed, on
the whole, the administrators most competent to reduce the naval and military
strength of the country, and I am bound to say that the country, which is
always just to public men, has unanimously agreed that these right hon.
Gentlemen have entirely fulfilled the confidence reposed in them. But I cannot
help making one remark upon the conduct in this respect of the right hon.
Gentleman at the head of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman challenged
the existence of the late Government upon a grave question of policy with
regard to Ireland in a manly and straightforward manner. I have not changed my
opinion as to that policy; I did not think it was a policy calculated to secure
the tranquillity of Ireland and put an end to those feuds which seem indigenous
to that country, or that it would make every district of that island a Utopia.
Still, no one can deny that the right hon. Gentleman came forward on that
occasion in a manly, straightforward manner. His policy was openly declared,
and he appealed to the last Parliament, elected by the restricted constituency,
and the last Parliament gave him a large majority. At a later period he
appealed to the Parliament elected by the new constituency, and that majority
was increased. The right hon. Gentleman, therefore, gained his position, as far
as the policy for Ireland, was at issue, in the most clear and honourable
manner; and no one grudged him his triumph—at least, I did not. But the right
hon. Gentleman was a candidate for the suffrages of a large and, as he
believed, of an economically inclined constituency, and, not having sufficient
confidence in the bold policy he had enunciated, he suddenly turned round, and
apparently to obtain votes, in which he did not even succeed, he denounced the
then Government on account of the extravagance of their military and naval
establishments. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Expenditure.] Well, we will not quarrel about
the word; it comes to the same thing whichever we use. But the right hon.
Gentleman, denouncing the extravagance of the late Government, said to the
electors—"If I am in power next year I will terminate all this
expenditure; I will put an end to these costly establishments, and you shall
have a great reduction of taxation in consequence." This was a mere
episode in the career 80 of the right
hon. Gentleman. It did not obtain him the seat he then solicited, nor do I
believe it obtained for him half-a-dozen seats in this House. He would have had
a complete majority if he had adhered to his first policy, which, though I
believe erroneous, was the policy of a statesman, was perfectly intelligible,
and had been deliberated upon in this House. My complaint against the right
hon. Gentleman is that when he was summoned by his Sovereign to occupy the
highest position in the kingdom, with a responsibility attached to it which no
language can describe, and no degree of feeling equal, the right hon. Gentleman
could not have been 10 minutes in the Cabinet of the Queen without knowing that
the representations he had made respecting the military and naval expenditure
of the country and the consequent reduction which he had pledged himself to was
one of the greatest mistakes any Minister could possibly have made. The facts
upon which this conclusion would be arrived at by him were State secrets at the
time; but they have since been revealed in ravaged Europe. Why, the right hon.
Gentleman sent his most trusty Councillor upon these subjects abroad to examine
into these matters; he sent the member of his Cabinet on whom he naturally most
depended for a correct opinion upon the state of Europe. Lord Clarendon went to
the Continent. Lord Clarendon had conferences in Germany with more than one
Sovereign, and with many most eminent statesmen. By one of those lucky
combinations which sometimes occur in public life, Lord Clarendon met the Prime
Minister of Russia, Prince Gortchakoff, who happened to be in Germany at that
period, and he had confidential conferences with Prince Gortchakoff; and the
consequence of these communications with German Sovereigns and statesmen and
the Chancellor of Russia was that Lord Clarendon repaired to the capital of
France, and conferred confidentially with the Emperor of the French. Now, Sir,
there may be difference of opinion as to the position of the late Lord
Clarendon as a statesman, as there will be upon the character and career of
every public man. Perhaps Lord Clarendon was more adapted for an Ambassador
than a Minister of State; others may differ from this view, but no one will
dispute that Lord Clarendon was a consummate man of the world, 81 with a quick
perception of character, and gifted with that versatile and captivating
sympathy which extracts secrets from the most reserved, and obtains the confidence
of the most close. Now all this time Lord Clarendon was communicating
confidentially with the right hon. Gentleman—the right hon. Gentleman admitted
this at the close of last Session—and who can doubt what were the results at
which Lord Clarendon arrived? Lord Clarendon must have comprehended the whole
situation—the danger to the peace of Europe from the continued rivalry of
France and Prussia; the causes which prevented Prussia from commencing the
contest; the restraint necessary in consequence to impress upon the Emperor of
the French; and the right hon. Gentleman must have been perfectly well aware of
everything Lord Clarendon did, of everything that passed through his mind, and
of all the information that he gained. Under all these circumstances, it is to
me most difficult to comprehend the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman. I
cannot understand how a person filling the position of the right hon. Gentleman
should have deemed himself bound by the rash rhetoric of the hustings to
continue those reductions of what he calls expenditure, but which are,
practically speaking, establishments, seeing that the reduction is, in fact, a
reduction in the number of men and boys and in the amount of stores. How is it
possible that the right hon. Gentleman could, possessing this knowledge, have
pursued such a course, and countenanced the framing of harum-scarum Budgets
which have dissipated the resources of the nation?
The danger which Lord
Clarendon must have foreseen eventually resulted in the war between France and
Germany; and now let me impress upon the attention of the House the character
of this war. It is no common war, like the war between Prussia and Austria, or
like the Italian war in which France was engaged some years ago; nor is it like
the Crimean War. This war represents the German Revolution, a greater political
event than the French Revolution of last century — I don't say a greater, or as
great, a social event. What its social consequences may be are in the future.
Not a single principle in the management of our foreign affairs, accepted by
all statesmen for guidance 82 up to six months
ago, any longer exists. There is not a diplomatic tradition which has not been
swept away. You have a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown
objects and dangers with which to cope, at present involved in that obscurity
incident to novelty in such affairs. We used to have discussions in this House
about the balance of power. Lord Palmerston, eminently a practical man, trimmed
the ship of State and shaped its policy with a view to preserve an equilibrium
in Europe; and we have recently been favoured with a letter from M. Guizot to
the right hon. Gentleman opposite, in which the balance of power is declared to
be absolutely necessary to the peace of Europe. We have heard hon. Gentlemen in
this House, on some occasions, deride the idea of a balance of power as
altogether a fancy; but what has really come to pass in Europe? The balance of
power has been entirely destroyed, and the country which suffers most, and
feels the effects of this great change most, is England. Now, what has been the
first consequence of the destruction of the balance of power by this war, which
I sincerely believe, if we had been energetic and prepared, this country might
have prevented? The first consequence is that Russia repudiates the Treaty of
1856. There is nothing in diplomatic history so unqualified as the repudiation
of the settlement of 1856 by Russia. Now, I am not going to inveigh against the
designs of Russia. Russia has a policy, as every great Power has a policy, and
she has as much right to have a policy as Germany or England. I believe the
policy of Russia, taking a general view of it, to have been a legitimate
policy, although it may have been inevitably a disturbing policy. When you have
a great country in the centre of Europe, with an immense territory, with a
numerous and yet, as compared with its colossal area, a sparse population,
producing human food to any extent, in addition to certain most valuable raw
materials, it is quite clear that a people so situated, practically without any
seaboard, would never rest until it found its way to the coast, and could have
a mode of communicating easily with other nations, and exchanging its products
with them. Well, for 200 years Russia has pursued that policy; it has been a
legitimate, though a disturbing policy. It has cost Sweden 83 provinces,
and it has cost Turkey provinces. But no wise statesman could help feeling that
it was a legitimate policy—a policy which it was impossible to resist, and one
which the general verdict of the world recognized—that Russia should find her
way to the seacoast. She has completely accomplished it. She has admirable
seaports; she can communicate with every part of the world, and she has
profited accordingly. But at the end of the last century she advanced a new
view. It was not a national policy; it was invented by the then ruler of
Russia, a woman, a stranger, and an usurper—and that policy was that she must
have the capital of the Turkish Empire. That was not a legitimate, it was a
disturbing policy. It was a policy like the French desire to have the
Rhine—false in principle. She had no moral claim to Constantinople; she did not
represent the races to which it once belonged; she had no political necessity
to go there, because she had already two capitals. Therefore, it was not a
legitimate, but a disturbing policy. As the illegitimate desire of France to
have the Rhine has led to the prostration of France, so the illegitimate desire
of Russia to have Constantinople led to the prostration of Russia. Now, when
Russia repudiated the Treaty of 1856 I do not think the course pursued by Her
Majesty's Government was a wise one. I admire the reasoning by which Her
Majesty's Secretary of State showed to the Russian Minister the fallacy of his
position; but I think that the inference he drew from his own premises was lame
and impotent. Our proper answer to the first note of Prince Gortchakoff should
have been to protest against it, and to have said at once that Russia must take
the consequences of such a step. In that case, I doubt very much whether at
this moment we should have heard any more about it. But that was not the course
adopted by Her Majesty's Government. The plan of a Conference on the Treaty of
1856, which France could not attend, was not politic; and the inability of
France to take part in it was alone a sufficient reason in refusing to listen
to any such project. Let me recall to the House for a moment the circumstances
under which the Treaty of 1856 was negotiated. I know there are hon. Gentlemen
on both sides of the House who 84 think the
Crimean War was a great mistake. I am not one of them. I think the Crimean War
might have been prevented. I have not the slightest doubt that in the month of
July, 1854, if our Government had informed the Government of Russia that war
would be the consequence of their passing the Pruth, the Pruth would not have
been passed. I believe that is not now mere conjecture, but a matter of
acknowledged fact. But when that war was declared I believe it was a just and
necessary war; I believe there never was a war carried on for a nobler purpose
or with purer intentions, nor one which the people generally of this country
ever supported with more enthusiasm. There was a great demur at the time as to
the terms of peace; they were not thought adequate. It is true they did not
call upon Russia, under defeat, to yield up any of her provinces; and I wish
that fact could be recollected by other Powers. It is true, also, that the
Allies did not propose to mulct Russia by calling on her to pay a great
indemnity; and that, too, should not be forgotten by nations who are influenced
by precedents. But I think the Treaty was admirable, because it devised a plan
for neutralizing the Black Sea, which absolutely, as far as human arrangements
could control affairs, really prevented that part of the world again disturbing
the general peace. Well, that Treaty was regarded, at the time as a magnanimous
Treaty. I believe it was so accepted by Russia. She obtained terms after the
fall of Sebastopol as favourable as those which she refused at the Conference
of Vienna. I doubt there is an example of such terms being offered by the
conqueror under similar circumstances. Now, Sir, I do not pretend to divine
what is passing at the Conference. All sorts of rumours are afloat; but I
cannot understand, or conceive it possible, that a British Minister, after the
immense sacrifices made by the Allies, and especially by this country, in order
to obtain that Treaty of 1856, will consent in Conference to give up the whole
point for which those sacrifices were incurred. There really is nothing in the
Treaty of 1856 of vital importance — nothing that did secure and can maintain
the general peace of Europe with regard to that part of the world, except the
termination 85 of the naval
preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea by a plan which spared the pride of a
great country. To obtain that result the Allies expended three hundred millions
of treasure. I cannot trust myself to tell what was the loss in human lives,
infinitely more valuable. You fought four pitched battles and made two of the
most terrific assaults ever known in the history of sieges, and all to obtain
this result. Why, there is hardly a family in England, from the haughtiest to
the humblest, which has not some painful recollection of the sufferings and
sacrifices of that war. In my parish church there is a memorial window to the
memory of two sons of an hon. Baronet, once a Member of this House, both of
whom fell in the Crimea. The eldest, who was little more than of age—a youth of
great promise and distinguished appearance—had just married, and the very week
after his marriage he was summoned to his regiment, one of the finest in our
service—the 23rd Fusiliers. He fell at Alma after many acts of valour. Exactly
a year afterwards his next brother, who had succeeded to his title—an officer
of Artillery, also in the same army — died in the trenches before Sebastopol.
The mother of those gallant youths raised that memorial window in my parish
church because—to use her own words—amid her terrible sorrows she had the proud
consolation of knowing that her sons had died for their country. But now you
are going to tell her that she is not to have that proud consolation—that they
did not die either for the honour or the interest of their country—that it was
all moonshine. I think that the mothers of England will feel very differently
in future, and the sons of England, too, will not be so lavish of their lives,
if this mockery is to occur. But the most curious thing in all this affair of
the Treaty of 1856 is the conduct of Her Majesty's Government when they
received the note of Prince Gortchakoff; and it is to me perfectly incredible.
What did Her Majesty's Government do? They consulted Count Bismarck—certainly a
most eminent man, and there is no man whose opinion on a difficult question I
should think more valuable. But he is the Minister of Prussia, who was not our
ally in the Crimean campaign, and whose conduct then was equivocal and
ambiguous; and they sent, as 86 I
understand—but we are to have the Papers laid before us, and I am sure Papers
were never more wanted — they sent Mr. Odo Russell in their difficulty to
consult Count Bismarck. Now, what said Count Bismarck? Count Bismarck said
this—"I see that your Government is extremely indignant because Russia has
repudiated the Treaty of 1856. Well, it is a very extraordinary thing; but only
three months ago your Prime Minister repudiated a most solemn treaty with
regard to my country — namely, that which guaranteed the Saxon provinces to my
Sovereign." Why, at that moment it was a toss up whether those Saxon
provinces would or would not be invaded, and I believe it is in those very
provinces that Count Bismarck's estate is situated, though that is a matter
that of course would not affect his opinion. However, Count Bismarck, with that
cynical cordiality which distinguishes him, said—"Notwithstanding the way
in which you have treated us, I will do everything I can for you. I will
suggest a Conference, and the practical consequence of a Conference is that you
condone the great offence of Russia, and then that will happen at the Conference
which always does happen at Conferences to which Russia is a party, and
particularly where Prussia also is a party—namely, that Russia will gain her
object." But Count Bismarck is a man of the world who goes with the times;
so he does not stop here—the Treaty of Vienna is an obsolete treaty; the Treaty
of 1856 is now successfully repudiated by Russia; the balance of power no
longer exists. And therefore the unfortunate Sovereign Prince of Luxemburg, to
secure the neutrality of whose territory we had laboured, and had incurred so
great a risk, has notice served upon him, which puts an end to the Treaty of
Luxembourg. That is the third repudiated treaty. Now let me say one word about
that Treaty. I wish to speak thus, because the matter has not been so much
before the House of Commons as might be desirable, and the observations of a
Secretary of State have not been correctly apprehended. By the Treaty of
Luxemburg the five signataries gave a joint guarantee to maintain the
neutrality of the Grand Duchy, and the question has been raised as to what were
our liabilities in respect of the joint guarantee. I do not apprehend 87 that as
regards our liabilities to the Grand Duke of Luxemburg the slightest difficulty
is likely to arise. I believe that the liability of each of the co-signataries
towards the Grand Duke of Luxemburg merely extends to this—that they shall not
themselves violate the neutrality of his territory. But the liabilities that
the signataries to that Treaty incur to each other in respect of the engagement
are much larger and of a far more complicated character. Guarantees of the
neutrality of their territories are not given to Princes out of mere affection
or personal respect—they are given for much larger objects, to secure the peace
of Europe and to maintain the general tranquillity. And therefore a signatary
of the Treaty who violates the neutrality of the territory of the Grand Duke of
Luxemburg incurs a large responsibility to England and to the other signataries
of the instrument; and it would be open to us, at any moment and in any manner
we might think proper, to assert our rights if they should be so violated. It
has been said that there is in existence a secret Treaty between Prussia and
Russia entered into before the war. I make no statement to that effect myself.
It once fell to my lot, in reference to transactions relating to the Crimean
War, to state to this House that there was in existence a secret Treaty between
two great Powers—France and Austria—having reference to the state of Italy, by
which the former undertook not to attack the latter in case certain things
should be done in the course of that war, and Lord Palmerston contradicted me
upon the subject. In about a week after, however, Lord Palmerston, as a man of
honour, having ascertained the real facts, thought it his duty to come down to
the House and to acknowledge that such a Treaty did exist. I merely advert to
that circumstance to show that I make no such assertions until I am convinced
of their truth. When I am convinced of the existence of a Treaty such as I have
described between Prussia and Russia, I shall state the fact openly in this
House. I feel called upon, however, to make this remark—that if, when Her
Majesty's Government communicated with Count Bismark respecting the repudiation
of the Treaty of 1856, they were ignorant of the existence of such a Treaty,
they were exceedingly ill-informed; but if 88 they were
aware of its existence—and I wish the House to observe this possibility
particularly — and yet under such circumstances made the appeal to Count
Bismarck which led to this Conference, then I say that the conduct of Her
Majesty's Government is of a very grave character, and that the censure of this
House would be a very light punishment for them to undergo.
There is another Treaty upon
which I will not stop to make a comment, which has been violated in consequence
of the destruction of the balance of power produced by this war—a war which, I
believe, England might have prevented, and that is the Treaty which secured
Rome to His Holiness the Pope, entered into by the King of Italy, by which the
latter bound himself to defend the former from all aggression. We were not parties
to that Treaty, and can be only indirectly concerned and interested in it; but
the violation of that Treaty is, in my opinion, complete. I am not at all
surprised at the result; it is the necessary result of the alliance between the
Papacy and Liberalism. Why the Pope should destroy Churches—even if they were
Irish Protestant Churches—and why he should secularize ecclesiastical property,
I never could understand. His Holiness, however, succeeded in his object; but
the Protestant Church Establishment in Ireland was not legally disestablished
at the time when the Papacy was disestablished itself. I do not dwell upon this
Treaty, because I have no doubt but that in the course of this debate we shall
have a satisfactory vindication of the policy of the Government, and a complete
interpretation of their views, from the hon. Member for Perth (Mr. Kinnaird).
Now, Sir, I have shown the
House what a complicated state of affairs, what difficulties, and what possible
dangers have arisen in Europe from this war, which has destroyed the balance of
power, and which war, I think, might have been prevented. But those
difficulties and dangers are not limited to Europe. The Atlantic Cable
unhappily conveys not only communications relating to commercial matters.
Everything that happens in the diplomatic circles of Europe appears to reach
the other side of the great waters with a rapidity rivalling that by which the
knowledge of the price of gold and 89 of cotton is
conveyed across the Atlantic. I am surprised at the course which was taken by
the Sovereign of America in this matter. I should have thought that he would
not have condescended to imitate the example of Europe. But to my great
surprise the United States have also got hold of a Treaty with this country
which they intend to repudiate. This Treaty was a treaty negotiated—as all
treaties entered into with the United States have been negotiated—with great
concessions on our side. The enjoyment of it was lost, wantonly lost by the
United States by their abrogation of the treaty of reciprocity with Canada,
although even after that occurrence they enjoyed the advantages of its
provisions for many years longer by the forbearance and indulgence of English
statesmen. That Treaty is now brought forward by the United States as an act of
injustice on our part and as a means and opportunity for misunderstanding. I was
very glad to hear from the Queen's Speech that the attention of England had
been directed to this question, and that there seems to be a prospect of having
at least some formal communication upon the question. There is one point
connected with America which I cannot refrain from noticing, and that is, the
extraordinary tone in which the authorities of America communicate with our
Government and with the people of this country. The tone of the American
Government towards the Government of England is different from that used
towards the Government of any other country. It is not, as I once thought, the
rough simplicity of Republican manners that occasions a rudeness so painful.
Nothing can be more courteous than the Government of the United States to the Russian
Government and, I have no doubt, to the German Government; but if they have any
communications to make to the Government of this country, or any cause to give
their opinion as to the conduct of the English people, a tone is adopted and
language used which it may be forbearing not to notice for a time, but which,
if persisted in, must ultimately lead to consequences which, though they may
not be intended, all will deplore. Now, I am not going to dwell upon the wild
words of demagogues, who, I suppose, in the United States, as in all other
countries, are reckless in their expres- 90 sions. I am
talking of persons of high official authority. I will take, for instance, the
chief Senator (Mr. Sumner)—I look upon the Chairman of the Committee for
Foreign Affairs as the chief man in the Senate, and only second to the
President, for to a certain degree he exercises the functions of royalty. No
treaty with the United States can, I believe, be concluded without his
concurrence. This gentleman commenced his Parliamentary career last year by an
invective against the British Government. Having to deal with the difficulties
between the two countries, having to exercise the functions of a judge and a
statesman, he commenced the campaign by a violent invective against the English
Government and the English nation, exciting the passions of the people of
America. Then the President of the United States, the Sovereign of America,
recently in one of those grave State papers which a person of his exalted
position periodically produces, having occasion to speak of the English
Government and people uses language which I wish I could describe as either
friendly or respectful. It was, I think, very unfortunate that the Fenian
prisoners were sent to America. It is a questionable thing to me whether they
ought to have been amnestied. But, as I have said on a former occasion, it is
best that an amnesty should be complete; and if they were to be freed I think
they ought to have been allowed to go to Ireland, instead of being sent to
America as first-class passengers in a Cunard boat, with a £5 note in their
pockets. The people of America received them, in pursuance of the system of
always insulting this country, with all honour, and by a large majority in the
House of Representatives decided to treat them with every possible respect. I
want to know what is the reason why the Government and people of England are
treated by the Government of the United States in a different manner from that
in which other countries are treated. The time has come when we ought to know
that. At the first blush one would think it impossible for two nations to be on
terms of more thorough and complete understanding. Notwithstanding the Celtic
or Teutonic emigration which the hon. Gentleman who seconded the Address (Mr.
Morley) has noticed, the English character of the original settlers 91 in these
colonies has always predominated. They have, perhaps, improved our language; but
they still speak it. We have the same laws, the same literature, and the same
religion. Our commercial relations are on a vast scale; and though our terms of
exchange might be improved, the reciprocal benefit is great and unquestioned.
There is every circumstance which ought to unite two nations in the bonds of
real friendship, and yet it is impossible that the Government or the people of
this country can be brought in any public way before the authorities of the
United States without some expression being used, or some course taken which is
offensive to our honour. What is the cause of this? It cannot arise from the
original quarrel. The result of the original quarrel was certainly calculated
to leave feelings of humiliation and vindictiveness, but not on the part of the
Americans. Nor can it arise from the course taken by England during the Civil
War. Nothing is more unjust than the statement that the cause of the Southern
States was taken up by either party in this country; and, with regard to the
charges so constantly made, that the party represented on this side of the
House acted in a party sense with regard to the Southern Confederation, it is
utterly untrue. There were hon. Gentlemen, no doubt, on both sides of the House
who expressed their opinions and brought forward Motions; but nothing like a
party Motion was ever made. The late Lord Derby, who was well acquainted with
America, from the first believed that the Northern Confederation would be
successful, and as regards the House of Parliament where he was eminent he
surely may be assumed to represent the party sitting on this side. As regards
this House, I may, perhaps, though with less authority, claim to be regarded as
the representative, and under no circumstances whatever did I sanction any such
Motion, and for this reason alone, if not others—I felt that it was impossible
to limit our interference to the recognition of the Southern States. It would
have involved us in a war with the Northern States, and of such a result I
would not take the responsibility. Sir, there is no ground for the charge. It
is futile. The reason of this offensive conduct of the United States is this —
There is a party in America, who certainly do 92 not
monopolize the intelligence, the education, and the property of the country,
and who, I believe, are not even numerically the strongest, who attempt to obtain
political power and to excite political passion by abusing England and its
Government because they believe they can do so with impunity. These are the
last men who would take this tone if they thought England would resent such
conduct; but the idea is impressed upon them that they may insult the
Government of England with impunity. You may say, if they have no really
hostile intent, and it is a mere electioneering game, is it not better for us
to be forbearing and contemptuous? Well, it is not exactly that. The danger is
this — Habitually exciting the passions of millions, some unfortunate thing
happens or something unfortunate is said in either country; the fire lights up,
it is beyond their control, and the two nations are landed in a contest which they
can no longer control or prevent. As there is to be a Commission, it would be a
very good opportunity for us to come to some clear understanding on the
subject, and let it be known England cannot be insulted or injured with
impunity; though I should look upon it as the darkest hour of my life if I were
to counsel or even support in this House a war with the United States, still
the United States should know that they are not an exception to the other
countries of the world — that we do not permit ourselves to be insulted by any
other country in the world—and that they cannot be an exception. If once our
naval and military establishments were in that condition which, I hope, on
Thursday, or some early day, we shall find they are—if once it is known that Her
Majesty's dominions cannot be assaulted without being adequately defended—all
this rowdy rhetoric which is addressed to irresponsible millions, and, as it is
supposed, with impunity, will, I believe, cease.
Now, Sir, that is the state of
affairs which we have to deal with at the commencement of the Session. And as
there is not one of the subjects which I have mentioned which will not,
probably, be brought forward for our consideration in its course, it has seemed
to me not inappropriate that, on the first day, some general view should be put
before the House of the consequences of the war be- 93 tween
Germany and France. The whole machinery of States is dislocated. There is not
an engagement between Powers which is not impugned or looked upon with
suspicion and without confidence, and it is very likely that with every one of
the countries to which I have alluded we shall have to discuss our diplomatic
engagements and the stipulations which now exist. I hope I may presume to say
that I have never been what is called an alarmist. I have never magnified the
dangers which this country has had to undergo. I hope I may add that I have
never been in favour of a meddlesome policy, though I am not prepared to
support what is called non-intervention under all circumstances. I am quite
aware that the relations of England to Europe are different now from what they
were at the Treaty of Utrecht, or even in the time of Lord Chatham, and that
other than European elements, great in themselves and considerably affecting
the balance of power, have grown up which could not have been taken into
consideration by the statesmen of that day. But I cannot resist the conviction
that this country is in a state of great peril, and that it will require the
utmost prudence and courage to extricate her from the consequences of recent
events. A distinguished man, long a Member of this House, an eminent statesman,
whom I am sure even his opponents must always speak of with respect—Lord
Russell—has called the attention of the public to the fact that there is in
States a natural jealousy of any dominion that rises up chiefly by the
influence of commerce. There is no doubt that there have been periods before
this when a feeling—not, I think, a rational, but a general feeling—of
hostility to the United Kingdom has existed which nothing but fortunate
circumstances or the exertion of great energy on our side could have dispelled
or baffled. I remember in a discussion in this House 20 years ago, when a
feeling of this kind had grown up, reminding the House of what occurred at the
Treaty of Cambrai. That was a treaty under which the Confederate Powers of
Europe determined, without any cause whatever and from mere jealousy of Venice,
of her mercantile spirit and great wealth, and from irritation at the reserve
with which she had declined mixing herself up in their separate plans, 94 to cut the
pinions of that great Republic. No doubt there is even considerable similarity
between the condition of Great Britain and the Republic of Venice. Venice had
all the commerce of the world, the finest navy, and a good army, commanded by
strangers and foreigners it is true, but still by distinguished generals. She
held Cyprus in fee; she possessed the Morea, the peninsula of the Ægean—the
same to her that India is to us—the best islands of the Ionian and Ægean seas,
and every province of the terra firma of Italy distinguished for civilization
and culture, except the Grand Duchy of Milan. But there are also differences
between the United Kingdom and Venice. Venice had not a numerous and warlike
population. She had not a high-spirited middle-class, and she had a suspicious
and tyrannical oligarchy instead of an open and real aristocracy. I understand,
that some distinguished statesmen have been speaking of England as a country
that is past as regards political power, and as one that has sacrificed all her
reputation and her real power merely to the accumulation of wealth. Well, I am
glad that during the 50 years of peace that more or less we have enjoyed—we
have accumulated wealth, and it is a great consolation to me to know that
if—which God forbid—we should have to defend ourselves and assert our position
in the world, we could enter, as I am sure no other Power could, into a third
campaign without finding the sinews of war fail us. It is a great source of
strength to England to feel that if she enters into a quarrel which is
necessary and just, she is not likely to find her resources exhausted; whereas,
it would be very difficult to fix on any other Power, with all their
boastfulness, that in the second or third year of hostilities would not be
found upon the different Exchanges of Europe endeavouring to raise loans to an
amount, moreover, not as large as we could raise by a single tax. But in the 50
years which have elapsed we have done something besides accumulating money, and
it is well that this should be known by those who make such free comments upon
England and the English people. The people of the United Kingdom enjoy at this
moment complete personal and political liberty. Those two great subjects that
used to disturb our predecessors, and were the foundation of half the 95 encumbering
orders of this House—trade and religion—are no longer any source of difficulty
to us since they have taken the shape of commercial freedom and religious
equality. We passed last year a Primary Education Bill, not so various in its
elements as I hope to live to see pass, but still a real Elementary Education
Bill. The people of this country have had the opportunity of following their
industry and enjoying their rights in a manner which cannot be equalled by the
records of any modern or ancient nation; and I do not believe that a population
thus circumstanced is going to give up such blessings without a struggle, or
will yield so pre-eminent a position without at least proving that they are
worthy of it. There are many observations that I could make upon details of the
gracious Speech and of the Address which we are called upon to vote in answer.
It is one of the longest Speeches that, I believe, was ever delivered to
Parliament from the Throne. It touches on many subjects; there are expressions
in it which might be criticized; and there are some points which might, under
ordinary circumstances, warrant even a graver notice. But I think it of
importance that we should show to Europe and to America, on the present
occasion, when we re-assemble, an united Parliament; and though, no doubt, we
shall have differences of opinion on minor points, I apprehend that on the
vital question there is no difference of opinion among the great majority of
the House. I believe we are resolved that the military and naval institutions
of this country shall be adequate to the occasion. We hope—aye, more than hope,
we believe—the Government are going to bring forward measures which will meet
the exigencies of the case. In that case I shall give those measures my entire
support; if there are points of detail of which I may not approve, I shall
waive my opposition, if it will endanger the security of their passing. I would
even make some sacrifice of principle to support their proposals, if they be
adequate to the occasion, as I hope and believe they will be. But, although I
am not prepared with any Amendment upon this occasion, or to ask the House to
come to any declaration of opinion upon a state of affairs that I do not think
devoid of peril, and which all, I 96 think, must
admit to be most critical, still I could not be altogether silent, after the
conversations which occurred in the last days of the late Session, and the
events which have since taken so grave a form. The opinions which I have expressed
I have teen emboldened to offer because I know they are shared by those who
generally act with me in public life—and also because I know that a great body
of persons throughout the country sympathize with us in our resolve, which is,
as far as our power may enable us to effect that object, to uphold the
greatness of our country, and to maintain the Empire of the Queen. “
Source:
Note:
Jean Vinatier
SERIATIM
2014
Internautes : Afrique
du Sud, Albanie, Algérie, Angola, Arabie Saoudite, Argentine, Arménie,
Australie, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Biélorussie, Bénin, Bolivie, Bosnie
Herzégovine, Brésil, Burkina Faso, Cambodge, Cameroun, Canada, Chili, Chine
(+Hongkong & Macao), Chypre, Colombie, Congo-Kinshasa, Corée du Sud,
Costa-Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, EAU, Egypte, Etats-Unis (30 Etats &
Puerto-Rico), Equateur, Ethiopie, Ghana, Gabon, Gambie, Géorgie, Guatemala,
Guinée, Guinée, Haïti, Honduras, Inde, Indonésie, Irak, Iran, Islande, Israël,
Jamaïque, Jordanie, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Laos, Liban, Libye, Liechtenstein,
Macédoine, Madagascar, Malaisie, Malawi, Mali, Maurice, Maroc, Mauritanie,
Mexique, Moldavie, Monaco, Népal, Niger, Nigeria, Norvège, Nouvelle Zélande,
Oman, Ouzbékistan, Palestine, Pakistan, Panama, Pérou, Philippines, Qatar,
République Centrafricaine, République Dominicaine, Russie, Rwanda, San
Salvador, Saint-Marin, Sénégal, Serbie, Singapour, Slovénie, Somalie, Suisse,
Syrie, Taiwan, Thaïlande, Togo, Tunisie, Turquie, Union européenne (27 dont
France + DOM-TOM, Nouvelle-Calédonie, Polynésie, Saint-Pierre–Et-Miquelon),
Ukraine, Uruguay, Vatican, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yémen
Aucun commentaire:
Enregistrer un commentaire